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Quo Vadis Palestine?
Martin Beck
Having received fairly little attention during the height of the Arab Spring, the 
Palestinian issue has once again become a focal point of Middle Eastern politics due 
to recent events in Palestine – namely, the failure of another round of US-promoted 
bilateral negotiations in May 2014, the Gaza War in summer 2014, several terrorist 
attacks, and Palestine’s membership in the International Criminal Court, which 
commenced on 1 April 2015. 
Analysis 
Current events related to the Palestinian issue appear to be contradictory and have left 
observers rather puzzled about what the future holds for Palestine. This issue of the 
GIGA Focus outlines and critically discusses three possible scenarios: a two-state settle-
ment, a one-state solution, and prolonged occupation.
  A two-state solution, which is based on the dominant paradigm that the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict will be “solved” sooner or later, could result either from a 
(bilateral) negotiation process – as favoured by the leading Western powers – or 
from a successful unilateral state-building process in Palestine. 
  A one-state solution (which is also a solution-based scenario) covering the territory 
of what is today Israel plus the occupied Palestinian territories (East Jerusalem, the 
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip) could take two forms: a binational democratic state 
of Israel/Palestine or a Jewish Israeli state.
  An alternative to these two solution-oriented scenarios is that, for the time being, 
occupation remains the form of government in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, 
and the Gaza Strip. This is based on the idea that, some adaptations to changing 
environments notwithstanding, occupation has proven to be robust since it was 
introduced following the June War of 1967.
Keywords: Palestine, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, PLO, Palestinian Authority, Future 
Scenarios
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Three Scenarios on the Future of Palestine
The present article analyses three scenarios on the 
future of Palestine: (1) a two-state solution result-
ing from either a negotiated bargain between Is-
rael and the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO)1 or a successful unilateral state-building 
process in Palestine; (2) a one-state state solution 
consisting of either a binational democratic Israe-
li–Palestinian state or a Jewish Israeli state; and 
(3) occupation remaining as the form of govern-
ment given its proven durability since being im-
plemented nearly 50 years ago.
Scenario 1: Two-State Solution
Two States as a Result of Bilateral Negotiations be-
tween Israel and the PLO
The two-state solution has served the internation-
al community as the dominant normative anchor 
in regulating the Israel–Palestine conflict since the 
1990s. When Yitzhak Rabin, the late Israeli prime 
minister, and Yasser Arafat, the late PLO chair-
man, signed the Oslo Declaration of Principles in 
September 1993 under the patronage of then US 
president Bill Clinton, expectations of a Palestin-
ian state coexisting peacefully with Israel peaked. 
However, the Oslo peace process collapsed as a 
result of fruitless negotiations at Camp David in 
July 2000, the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 
September 2000, and Israel’s harsh military re-
action to it. Several attempts to resume negotia-
tions between the two conflict parties failed. De-
spite this, the idea of a two-state settlement was 
strengthened from a normative perspective when 
in March 2002 the United Nations Security Council 
adopted the idea in Resolution 1397 (Smith 2013). 
Even when the Oslo peace process was at its 
strongest (1993–1995), significant structural ob-
stacles existed, making the realisation of the two-
state solution through bilateral negotiations rath-
er difficult. First and foremost, Israel has far su-
perior material capabilities than does the Pales-
tine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and has there-
1 Theoretically, a two-state settlement could also be the out-
come of a multilateral rather than a bilateral bargaining pro-
cess. After the failure of the half-hearted multilateralisation 
attempt of the “Quartet on the Middle East” (US, EU, UN, 
Russia), a systemic process of multilateralisation was de-
manded by some scholars and political actors but has not yet 
been set in motion (Huber and Kamel 2015). Therefore, the 
multilateralisation variant of Scenario 1 is not taken into ac-
count in the present article.
fore never had to agree to “painful compromises” 
– which has ensured the maintenance of the status 
quo. In other words, Israelis have lived very well 
in occupied Palestine for nearly 50 years and have 
little incentive to accept any agreement that does 
not clearly favour their own interests over those of 
the Palestinians.
Moreover, the benefits of the Oslo accords 
were very unevenly distributed: Israel was ful-
ly recognised as a state by the PLO, whereas Is-
rael only recognised the PLO as the representa-
tive of a people, but offered no commitment to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, not to men-
tion full sovereignty in the whole of East Jerusa-
lem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Last but 
not least, the Oslo accords also did not in any way 
restrict Israel from continuing its occupation of Je-
rusalem or settlement activities in the West Bank 
(Beck 2004).
Not only are these obstacles still in place, but 
for several reasons they appear much more un-
likely to be overcome in 2015 than in the 1990s. 
First, in both the Israeli and the Palestinian polit-
ical systems, the spoilers of any meaningful com-
promise – namely, extreme Islamist parties, on 
the one hand, and right-wing ultra-nationalist ac-
tors, on the other – have become much stronger. 
Second, as a result of the failed Oslo process and 
several attempts to resume it, the degree to which 
the conflict parties trust each other is significant-
ly lower than it was 20 years ago. Trust, howev-
er, is a basic prerequisite to achieving cooperation 
in the international system. Third, the Israeli set-
tler movement has succeeded in fastening the set-
tlement belt around Jerusalem. As a result of this 
colonisation of major parts of Palestine, even the 
most peace-oriented Israeli government would 
find it difficult to implement a policy that does not 
contradict the interests of the settlers in East Jeru-
salem and the West Bank. The settler movement 
has used the favourable conditions of the Oslo ac-
cords not only to become very well integrated and 
represented in mainstream Israel but also to in-
crease its number to roughly 750,000 people.
Two States as the Result of a Successful Unilateral 
State-Building Process in Palestine
Within the frame of the so-called Fayyad Plan, 
Western actors encouraged the Palestinian Au-
thority (PA) to build protostate institutions. In re-
ports presented in 2011 and 2012, the World Bank 
praised the Palestinian state-building process for 
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being very successful and the state institutions 
created for being highly effective (World Bank 
2012). Nevertheless, rather than supporting an in-
dependent Palestinian state, the West once again 
called on the Palestinians to enter bilateral negoti-
ations with Israel to achieve the aim of Palestinian 
statehood. As all previous rounds of bilateral ne-
gotiations with Israel since the Oslo accords had 
proven fruitless, in 2011 the PLO – under the lead-
ership of Mahmud Abbas – employed a strategy 
to secure international recognition of a Palestin-
ian state. Called Initiative 194, the aim of this ap-
proach was to gain full independence by making 
Palestine the 194th member of the United Nations.
Apart from gaining symbolic power, what is 
the rationale behind this approach? After all, the 
PLO had already officially declared the state of 
Palestine in November 1988. Yet, as long as Pal-
estine’s territory and the mobility of persons and 
goods in and out of Palestine is controlled by Is-
rael, the existence of the state of Palestine is in-
clined to remain a virtual phenomenon. Being rec-
ognised as an independent state could, howev-
er, provide Palestine with some leverage because 
there is a normative difference between whether 
Israel is occupying “territories” or a recognised 
“state”; in the latter context, Israel’s occupation 
would be seen as a fully-fledged imperialist poli-
cy, which would possibly go some way to further 
delegitimising the Israeli occupation.
Nevertheless, the United States had no hesita-
tion in declaring that Palestine’s unilateral claim 
to be a sovereign state was illegitimate and an-
nounced that it would veto the PLO’s attempt to 
become a full member of the United Nations in 
the UN Security Council. Insofar as there is no in-
dication that the United States will change its po-
sition, it is fair to say that this approach has failed. 
Mahmud Abbas did, however, see Palestine’s sta-
tus upgraded from “non-member observer en-
tity” to “non-member observer state” in a Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly vote in November 
2012. This success proved to be more than cosmet-
ic: First, some governments followed suit and es-
tablished full diplomatic relations with Palestine 
(such as Sweden in October 2014). Second, Pales-
tine used its new status served to successfully ap-
ply for membership of the International Crimi-
nal Court, which officially commenced on 1 April 
2015.2
2 BBC 2015, Will ICC Membership Help or Hinder the Palestinians’ 
However, both developments are very likely to 
fall short of securing “real” Palestinian statehood. 
There is currently no indication that the conflict is 
transitioning in a manner that will ease the hard-
ships of occupation for the Palestinian society. 
Those states that fully recognise Palestine lack the 
power to pressure Israel into abandoning its pol-
icy of occupation. Although the name-and-shame 
strategy of gaining full recognition may possibly 
deprive Israel of some of its soft power, Israel’s 
extensive hard power will remain untouched.3 At 
the same time, countries that fully recognise Pal-
estine as a sovereign state do not necessarily expe-
rience a deterioration in their relations with Israel. 
According to the Swedish foreign minister, Mar-
got Wallström, her country maintains excellent re-
lations with Israel.4 Moreover, Israel has strong al-
lies in the West, particularly the United States and 
Germany. Should Israeli officials be sentenced for 
war crimes by the International Criminal Court, 
this would be to the embarrassment of the court’s 
European members. Nonetheless, as neither Isra-
el nor the United States is a member, the impact 
thereof would be limited (Beck 2015b).
To sum up, the recent wave of recognition Pal-
estine has attained as well as the upgrades and 
memberships it has secured in major internation-
al organisations certainly represent an increase in 
symbolic power. In the diplomatic arena, for in-
stance, Palestine is playing at a significantly high-
er level than before Initiative 194 was launched. 
Despite this, symbolic upgrading has only had a 
very limited spillover effect in terms of easing the 
realities of occupation. There is also no indication 
that this could change in the foreseeable future 
(Beck 2015a). 
Scenario 2: One-State Solutions
A Binational Democratic State
The establishment of a binational democratic state 
rather than two states was deemed the “rational 
choice” for Palestinians and the “moral choice” 
for Israelis in an article co-authored by scholars 
Cause?, 1 April 2015; online: www.bbc.com/news/world-mid-
dle-east-30744701. 
3 For the concept of hard power versus soft power, see Joseph 
S. Nye (2004).
4 Jerusalem Post (2014), “Sweden Says Relations with Israel Ex-
cellent, despite Recalling of Ambassador,” 31 October 2014; 
online: www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diploma-
cy/Sweden-says-relations-with-Israel-excellent-despite-recal-
ling-of-ambassador-380392.
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Jenab Tutunji and Kamal Khaldi (1997), when 
the failure of the Oslo process, whose rationality 
was based on a two-state settlement, was already 
looming. Thus, unsurprisingly, the vision of a bi-
national state became more seriously discussed in 
the twenty-first century, particularly among Pal-
estinian intellectuals. The logic behind the idea of 
a binational democratic state is that Palestinians 
could realise self-determination in a democratic 
state in which approximately half of the popula-
tion is Palestinian. Although exact population fig-
ures are highly contested, there can be no doubt 
that the number of Palestinian Israelis (who make 
up roughly 20 per cent of Israeli citizens) and Pal-
estinians in the occupied territories is at least close 
to the number of Jewish Israeli citizens. More-
over, since the fertility rate amongst Palestinians 
is significantly higher than amongst Jewish Israe-
lis, and no other major Jewish immigration wave 
(as in the 1990s after the downfall of the Soviet 
Union) is expected, the Palestinian population 
in Israel and Israeli occupied territory will most 
probably outweigh the Jewish population within 
the foreseeable future.
The idea of a binational democratic Israeli–
Palestinian state enjoys strong normative power: 
if realised, the same state that has been depriv-
ing Palestinians of access to human and demo-
cratic rights for decades would become the war-
rantor of Palestinian rights. Nevertheless, the es-
tablishment of a binational democratic state ap-
pears to be rather unlikely. First, although there is 
some support for this approach within the Pales-
tinian community, there is no mass movement be-
hind it. Moreover, the political class of Palestine, 
albeit highly fragmented, basically agrees that a 
binational state is not desirable. Hamas and oth-
er Islamist parties would have trouble accepting 
Jewish Israelis as citizens with equal rights, not 
to mention the fact that such a move would re-
quire the PA to abandon its raison d’être – name-
ly, the idea of a Palestinian state living in peace-
ful coexistence with Israel. Second, and of even 
greater importance, a binational state contradicts 
the basic idea of Zionism, according to which Isra-
el must be a Jewish state. Thus, rather than serv-
ing as a “rational” or “moral” choice, the notion of 
a binational state is mostly used as a rhetorical ar-
gument by some Palestinian (and very few Israeli) 
liberals and leftists to underline that Israeli occu-
pation contradicts democratic values and human 
rights. From that point of view, focusing on the 
notion of a binational state may even be consid-
ered counterproductive, as it absorbs political and 
intellectual ideas that do not have a proper chance 
of realisation, as the overwhelming majority of the 
Jewish Israeli population is strongly opposed to it 
(Kamel 2015).
One of the factors that make a binational Is-
raeli–Palestinian state unlikely to ever occur is the 
same factor that also makes a two-state settlement 
improbable: Israel is too powerful to be inclined to 
swallow “painful compromises.” Moreover – and 
this renders the binational state scenario nothing 
more than a chimera – Israeli Zionism is funda-
mentally opposed to an Israeli state which is not 
based on Jewish identity.
Jewish Israeli State
Israel could extend its Zionist self-conception as 
a Jewish state to the Palestinian territories it oc-
cupied in 1967. It has already done so in East Je-
rusalem, which was de facto integrated into the 
Israeli state immediately after the 1967 June War 
and then de jure annexed in 1980, when the Israe-
li parliament (the Knesset) declared all of Jerusa-
lem the “eternal and indivisible” capital of Israel. 
The simple logic behind Israel extending its sov-
ereignty to (major parts of) the occupied territo-
ries in the West Bank is that it would change Is-
rael’s de facto rule of occupied Palestine into de 
jure rule. Thus, at first sight, one may consider the 
prospect of further annexation to be an attractive 
option for Israel.
Under current conditions, however, the costs 
of further annexation of major parts of the West 
Bank would outweigh the benefits for Israel. If all 
Palestinian territories were annexed, there would 
be no (clear) Jewish majority in the state of Israel, 
which would then have significantly greater trou-
ble obscuring its democratic deficits. Moreover, 
it would be extremely difficult for Israel to pre-
vent hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from 
moving freely in Israel. Even if Israel were to “on-
ly” annex those parts of Palestine that are dense-
ly populated by Jewish settlers, it would come un-
der pressure to release the “rest” of Palestine in-
to statehood. Contrary to a Palestinian state that 
emerges through bilateral negotiations, a Pales-
tinian state created as the outcome of the force-
ful integration of major parts of the West Bank in-
to the Israeli territory would be hostile to Israel. 
To put it differently, if Israel realises its national-
ist dream of a “Greater Israel,” it will forfeit the 
- 5 -GIGA Focus International Edition/English  7/2015
PA as a functional junior partner of the occupy-
ing regime.
Thus, if Israel were to formally annex further 
parts of Palestine, it would lose the political flex-
ibility that it has enjoyed as an occupying power 
for nearly 50 years. For example, in the past Israel 
was able to adapt its policy towards the Gaza Strip 
on several occasions to protect its interests with-
in a changing environment. In 1994/95 it passed 
over internal administration of the ecologically 
extremely challenged Gaza Strip to the PA. Then 
in 2005, within the scope of its policy of “unilater-
al disengagement,” Israel entirely withdrew from 
the coastal area densely populated by Palestinians 
without relinquishing its capability to control the 
access of goods and people to and from the Gaza 
Strip. Following Hamas’s shelling of Israeli terri-
tory in summer 2014, Israel took the opportunity 
to wage a comprehensive war on Gaza, whose de-
velopment was thereby affected for years.
The scenario of the Jewish Israeli state extend-
ing its borders in parts of the occupied Palestinian 
territories other than East Jerusalem would only 
appear to be likely if a significant amount of West 
Bank Palestinians were expelled over the Jorda-
nian border. Although the influence of Israeli ac-
tors favouring a “transfer solution” has increased 
since the failure of the Oslo process, such a move 
would only be deemed legitimate by Israel and 
particularly the international community in the 
wake of a major regional war – if at all. Even then, 
the costs for Israel would be high, particularly in 
terms of further delegitimising its existence as a 
state in the Middle East.
Although the scenario of the Jewish Israeli 
state expanding into major parts of occupied Pal-
estine cannot be excluded, such a move remains 
unlikely as long as Israel prefers the status quo: 
occupying Palestine.
Scenario 3: Occupation as a Durable Form of 
Government in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, 
and the Gaza Strip
Occupation has proven to be a much more robust 
and flexible instrument of government than possi-
bly could have been expected half a century ago. 
Within the context of occupation, Israel managed 
to diversify its rule over Palestine according to its 
various needs. East Jerusalem was annexed, thus 
making its territory – albeit not its people, the Pal-
estinians – an integral part of Israel. Most areas in 
the West Bank that are of “strategic” and/or “cul-
tural-religious” interest to Israel have been de fac-
to integrated into Israel, particularly the big set-
tlement blocs that are connected to Israel by cut-
ting-edge infrastructure. Israel has comparative-
ly low strategic and no cultural or economic in-
terests in the Gaza Strip and maintains excellent 
relations with the Egyptian political leaderships 
(at least before and after the one year interlude of 
Mohamed Mursi’s presidency in 2012/13) which 
enabled Israel to effectively seal the Gaza Strip – 
thereby preventing it from developing any signif-
icant development potential.
Rather than bringing an end to occupation, the 
Oslo process helped to legitimise it and facilitated 
its sophistication (Krieger 2015). As a result of its 
recognition of the PLO, Israel gained international 
and even regional legitimacy in the Middle East. 
At the same time, the PA served as a local junior 
partner in containing radical Palestinian groups. 
Despite the tension between Israelis and Palestin-
ians in terms of overall future conflict regulation, 
security cooperation between Israel and the PA 
generally functions well in the West Bank. At the 
same time, since the Oslo process, the internation-
al community (mainly the European nations) has 
taken over the bulk of the economic costs of occu-
pation by providing the Palestinians and the PA 
with “generous” financial aid.
Conclusion: Occupational Regime most likely 
Scenario
From a human rights perspective, the establish-
ment of a binational democratic Israeli–Palestin-
ian state (Scenario 2) may have the strongest nor-
mative power. Yet, mainstream normative orien-
tation sticks to the two-state solution (Scenario 1). 
If, however, a strict empirical-analytical perspec-
tive is applied, prolonged occupation (Scenario 3) 
appears to be more likely – as long as there are no 
major shifts in power dispersion between the Is-
raelis and the Palestinians. Israel’s vastly superior 
power enables it to live with the status quo of oc-
cupation and to adapt it as required. This context 
therefore makes the establishment of a binational 
democratic state very unlikely. The second vari-
ant of the one-state solution (Scenario 2) will on-
ly become a possibility if the power gap between 
the Israeli administration and key Palestinian ac-
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tors were to widen even further – for example, in 
the course of a major regional war.
According to the present analysis, a two-state 
solution (Scenario 1) is likely to remain the domi-
nant normative paradigm not only because it is fa-
voured by major international actors, but also be-
cause both Israel and the PLO have a strong in-
terest in keeping it alive. For instance, Israel pro-
motes the two-state solution because it would 
struggle to justify its repressive and undemocrat-
ic practice of occupation as an official form of gov-
ernment, whereas the PA owes its very existence 
to the bilateral Oslo process. However, a sustain-
able two-state solution will only become like-
ly if the power gap between Israel and the PLO 
significantly narrows. There is no indication that 
this could happen in the foreseeable future in ei-
ther economic or military terms. However, should 
Western perceptions of Israel’s occupation of Pal-
estine as a tolerable form of government begin to 
change, it could lead the West to push for multilat-
eral negotiations on a Palestinian state. Although 
such a development would help the Palestinians 
to partially compensate for their lack of power vis-
à-vis Israel, Israel has always been able to rely on 
unwavering support from the United States and 
Germany. As a result, continued occupation is the 
most likely scenario for the foreseeable future.
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